Public goods and ethnocultural diversity: A case of Nigeria by Gwozdz, Mateusz
  1 
 
Public Goods and Ethnocultural Diversity: A Case of Nigeria 
Presented by: Mateusz Gwozdz (31109583) 



















I declare that this thesis is my own account of my own research. It contains as its main 














  3 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................ 4 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... 5 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 6 
Social Diversity: The Theory........................................................................................................... 9 
Part 1: Social Diversity: The Academic Consensus  ..................................................................... 10 
Part 2: Nigeria and Its Problems ............................................................................................... 19 
 2.1: Political Stability and Ethnic Diversity   ............................................................................... 23 
2.2: Ethnocultural Cleavages and Public Security  .................................................................... 27 
2.3: Economic Development  ....................................................................................................... 32 
Conclusion  ............................................................................................................................. 36 
















I would like to thank my family, whose unwavering support made the production of this 
thesis so much easier, and my supervisor, Benjamin Reilly, whose comments allowed me to 
produce this study to the highest level possible. Any errors and flaws which remain at the 



















Ethnic and other cultural diversity has become something of an ideological holy of 
holies in Western societies. However, in spite of idealistic shibboleths surrounding 
the concept, academic literature broadly supports the contention that ethnocultural 
diversity is negatively correlated with public goods provision, political stability, 
economic growth and the like. As such, a broad reexamination of diversity’s 
inherent desirability is necessary. This paper takes a two-pronged approach by 
conducting a critical review of relevant literature, and cross-referencing it with the 
case study of Nigeria. Whilst multicultural “settler societies” such as the USA or 
Canada boast a number of fundamental differences to postcolonial, “primordially” 
diverse societies such as Nigeria, the latter nonetheless offers a number of 
generalizable lessons which can be broadly applied to Western statecraft and policy 
making as well. Broadly speaking, an analysis of Nigeria provides considerable 
circumstantial evidence to support the academic consensus on ethnocultural 
diversity, and allows one to conceptually link big-picture, longitudinal studies with 
micro-level studies. At the same time, it provides considerable nuance to those broad 
conclusions, indicating that even though ethnocultural diversity is broadly correlated 
with lower levels of public goods provision,  precise causes for this state of affairs 
tend to differ and diversity is far from the be-all, end-all of political instability, low 










Recently, “diversity” has become a buzzword in the Western world. The advent of 
multiculturalism has turned it from a neutral description of objective reality into a blueprint 
for a supposedly functional social and political system. Supporters defend multiculturalism, 
claiming it entails a sense of ‘shared national belonging and respect for diversity’, as well as 
common values, equality of opportunity, freedom of cultural expression and conscience.1 The 
desirability of ethnic and other social diversity is the conceptual, ideological and empirical 
foundation of the pro-diversity discourse. Therefore, determining its consequences is not a 
purely academic exercise, but is pressing from the policy making perspective as well. The 
purpose of this study is to contribute to the reevaluation of this policy by answering two 
major questions. The first is to establish the causal relationship between ethnic and other 
social diversity and good governance, economic growth, political stability and public 
security. To this end, I will conduct a critical review of relevant literature. The second part of 
the study will cross-reference the scholarly findings with a case study of multiethnic, 
multicultural Nigeria, which is famous for high levels of political corruption, developmental 
and economic crises and political instability. As such, the second major query is whether 
Nigeria’s problems are driven by some universal, diversity-related dynamic, historically 
contingent, localized issues or a combination of those factors. 
 
 
If one accepts the basic premises of the pro-diversity discourse, the more varied and diverse 
the country, the better-off it should be. However, even though Nigeria is a veritable 
microcosm of  social, linguistic and cultural diversity, it plainly contradicts this basic 
assertion. It encompasses three major ethnic groups (the Ibo, the Yoruba and the Hausa), in 
addition to numerous minorities, two major religions (Christianity and Islam, in addition to a 
number of minority creeds and traditional beliefs), four major languages (English, Ibo, 
Yoruba and Hausa, in addition to a myriad of local dialects) and a complex history of local 
                                                             
1 Antony Lerman, “In Defense of Multiculturalism”, The Guardian, March 23, 2010. 
Accessed on October 10, 2016. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/mar/22/multiculturalism-blame-culture-
segregation. 
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political structures, British colonial influences and post-independence crises. However, it is 
beset by religious strife, ethnic conflict, spectacular disproportions in wealth distribution, a 
history of persistent economic downturns and endemic corruption.3 All those issues severely 
inhibit the provision of public goods.   
 
Public goods refer to a broad number of concepts and phenomena, which are used 
collectively, belong to no one exclusively and remain available even to free riders, even 
though in an ideal model all users will contribute to their generation. They are divided into 
three major categories. The first of them are “pure” public goods, which can be used by 
anybody without diminishing it for anyone else (such as public security or scientific 
discoveries). The second type are “network” public goods, which become stronger and offer 
increasing utility as the number of users increases (languages and cultures are a prominent 
example). “Rival” public goods are the last type. They are defined by their finite nature, 
which means their availability decreases with each user (housing, transport infrastructure and 
the like are good examples). In the ideal model the level of individual contribution directly 
influences the quality and quantity of the public good on offer.2 From this perspective, 
political stability, public safety and good governance can be considered “pure” public goods, 
whereas economic development can be either “pure” or “rival”, depending on the budget 
available, political culture and the like. Indeed, I shall argue that patronage networks, 
described in detail in the second part of the study, make economic development in Nigeria 
highly “rivalrous”, which contributes to the country’s perennial instability. Moreover, the 
above four are preconditions for the provision of all other public goods.   
 
Granted, post-colonial and, to some extent, primordially ethnoculturally diverse societies 
such as Nigeria boast a number of fundamental differences to long-standing settler societies 
such as Australia or the United States. Settler societies were originally built by mostly white, 
European migrants, who came there to improve their lot in life, bringing their own cultural 
values and political systems with them and building the new societies on those foundations. 
As a consequence, settler societies developed in an organic way over extended periods of 
time, which gave them the time to iron out the differences between various migrant groups 
and establish a fundamentally cohesive society, at least until the advent of multiculturalism as 
                                                             
2  Josep Maria Colomer, The Science of Politics: An Introduction (Oxford University Press, 
2011), 3-31. 
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a normative ideology. Conversely, the same process has never occurred in post-colonial states 
such as Nigeria wherein borders were drawn rather arbitrarily, almost overnight merging 
drastically different and, on occasion, historically antagonistic groups into a single polity. As 
such, basic trajectories of both kinds of state bear considerable differences, and methods of 
social consolidation and state building which apply to one do not necessarily work in the 
other. However, both the post-settler, multicultural societies and “primordially” diverse 
societies share one key common denominator – ethnocultural diversity. As such, bearing the 
above caveats in mind, Nigeria still offers a number of lessons broadly applicable to 
























Social Diversity: The Theory 
A limited analysis of the United States and Canada conducted several years ago suggests that 
‘there is no evidence of a negative effect from multicultural policies and some limited 
evidence for a positive effect, but only in the first generation.’3 This conclusion is rather non-
committal and unsatisfying, as it ignores the question of whether the host populations are 
affected in the same way, and what the long-term consequences are. Likewise, the above 
claim does not take under consideration the specificities of sundry ethnic and cultural groups, 
instead lumping them together into a sweeping category of ‘immigrants’. Cultures are not 
necessarily cognate; they can be defined as sets of normative values and behavioural 
heuristics shared by a group large enough to make them into a norm. Those normative 
underpinnings can and do differ wildly across cultures. Theoretically, when two or more such 
different value systems attempt to coexist in the same political space, the probability of 
misunderstanding and conflict increases, both in “primordial” and settler societies, especially 
if the latter make it a point to preserve immigrant cultures rather than promote assimilation. 
This, in turn, may generate instability, lack of social trust and, in extreme cases, individual 
and collective physical clashes. Granted, ideological differences, ethnic politics as well as a 
lack of social cohesion are not the only indicators of violent conflict, as low levels of 
economic development and government incompetence are critical as well.4 Nonetheless, the 
former three are a significant part of this primordial mélange. As a corollary, two or more 
cultures which share the same core ideas and values are, theoretically, more likely to coexist 
in peace, both in multicultural settler societies and “primordial” communities. If those basic 
assumptions are correct, the relationship between ethnic and other social diversity and public 
security is not binary, and depends more on the alignment of values and loyalties than it does 
on the mere existence of multiple cultures in the same geographic space. These theoretical 
assertions will be tested in the case of Nigeria. 
                                                             
3 Irene Bloemraad and Mathew Wright, “‘Utter Failure’ or Unity out of Diversity? Debating 
and Evaluating Policies of Multiculturalism,” International Migration Review 48 (2014), 
292–334. 
4 J. D. Fearon and D.D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003); Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik Cederman and Brian 
Min, “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data 
Set”, American Sociological Review, vol. 74 no. 2 (2009), 75-90. 




Part 1: Diversity: The Academic Consensus 
A survey of relevant literature significantly contradicts the idealistic shibboleths concerning 
diversity. La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003), amongst others, indicate ethnic 
diversity is negatively correlated with infrastructure and educational attainment, but 
positively correlated with child mortality. According to Dayton-Johnson (2000), canal (a 
useful shorthand for public goods) maintenance is negatively correlated with ethnic diversity 
and unequal land distribution. The same dynamic seems to hold true in Pakistan, where 
project maintenance is negatively correlated with ethnic, tribal and religious fragmentation. 
Collier and Garg (1998) indicate that, in Ghana, ethnic fragmentation tends to lead to rent-
seeking behaviour and nepotistic hiring practices in public sector. In addition, unless this 
tendency is countered through uncompromisingly enforced legislation, kin hires tend to 
extract higher wages, which leaves less budget available for public goods provision.5 Easterly 
and Levine (1997) argue that whilst ethnic diversity is far from being the be-all, end-all of 
public policy and economic growth, it exerts a strong negative influence on them. 
Consequently, ethnic diversity does not automatically limit growth, but may generate policies 
which adversely affect economic development.6 In another study, Easterly (2001) asserts that 
negative effects of ethnic diversity can be mitigated or averted with well-developed 
institutions, though it is unclear which negative effects he is referring to, or how institutions 
can be effectively developed in a multi-ethnic context. Barr (2001) demonstrates that 
collective action and social trust are less effective and arithmetically more modest in 
ethnically diverse Zimbabwean villages, as opposed to more homogenous communities. 
Collier (2000) argues that high levels of ethnocultural diversity create a danger of a shift from 
performance politics to identity politics, with accountability based on economic and political 
performance taking the back seat to sectarian divisions.7  
Likewise, Easterly, Alesina et al. (2003) show that linguistic and ethnic fragmentation is 
inversely correlated with per capita GDP and economic growth.8 What remains to be settled, 
                                                             
5 Paul Collier, “Ethnicity, Politics, and Economic Performance”,   Economics and Politics 
12(3) (2000), 225-245. 
6 William Easterly and Ross Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic 
Divisions”, in Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997), 1203-1250. 
7 Collier, “Ethnicity, Politics, and Economic Performance”.  
8 Alberto Alesina et al., “Fractionalization”, Journal of Economic Growth 8 (2003), 55–94. 
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however, is whether low GDP is caused directly by fragmentation, or whether poor economic 
performance drives fragmentation. This author would argue that the relationship may well be 
a self-sustaining positive feedback loop, with its starting point depending on the kind of 
society we are dealing with. The economies of countries which begin ethnically fragmented, 
such as Nigeria and Sudan, are likely to be adversely affected by the pre-existing ethno-
political issues, as will be demonstrated in the next part of the study. On the other hand, 
countries which start off more or less homogenous but later acquire sizeable minorities may 
struggle with assimilating them into their economic systems, which slows economic growth. 
Conversely, the authors claim there doesn’t seem to be a negative correlation between 
religious fragmentation and the quality of government. However, this assertion requires two 
clarifications. First of all, absence of correlation tells us nothing about the objective quality of 
said governments. Likewise, in case of quality governance it may well be the case that 
religious diversity forces the authorities to govern in a way that irons out potential religious 
conflict. The exact causal relationship remains to be discovered, though.  
 
When exploring the relationship between ethnicity, governance and public security one 
caveat must be borne in mind. Ethnicity is a highly contested concept, based on criteria such 
as language, culture, race, and self-identification. Likewise, “ethnicity” can exist for extended 
periods of time, but its nature can change. For instance, the division between the Hutu and the 
Tutsi in what is now Rwanda had existed for centuries, but was quite fluid. A successful Hutu 
could become a member of the Tutsi “aristocracy”, and a failed Tutsi could be “demoted” to 
Hutu. The Belgian authorities, however, introduced a system of ethnic identification which 
ended up unwittingly consolidating ethnic identity and encouraging exploitation of the Hutu 
on the Tutsis’ part.9 This is not to assign blame for the Rwandan genocide of 1995 solely to 
the Belgian colonisers, as the native Rwandans were still fully accountable for their actions, 
but this case illustrates the mutable nature of ethnicity and its possible grim consequences. As 
a corollary, some scholars believe that preferences for public policies depend largely on 
ethnic identity, largely constructed though it may be. For instance, preference for job-
generating policies in Nigeria seems to differ between the three major ethnic groups (59 per 
cent for the Igbo, 47 per cent for the Yoruba and only 37 per cent for the Hausa).10 Others 
claim ethnic diversity leads to socioeconomic inequalities because of ethnic nepotism, but 
                                                             
9 Ibid 
10 Evan S. Lieberman and Gwyneth H. McClendon, “The Ethnicity-Policy Preference Link in 
Sub-Saharan Africa”, Comparative Political Studies 46(5) (2012), 574-602. 
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that the core preferences remain largely the same across all the ethnic groups in each society. 
In order to test these propositions, Lieberman et al. (2012) examined several ethnicities split 
between different countries (the Yoruba divided between Nigeria and Benin, the Chewa 
inhabiting Malawi and Zambia, and the Luos spread across Kenya and Uganda). Their basic 
assumption was that if preferences were caused by ethnic identities, the former would be 
consistent across the borders. They discovered that ethnic identity is a strong factor in policy 
preference, albeit not the only one.11 As a corollary, the differences between public policy 
preferences appear to differ depending on ethnicity in a number of other cases, though factors 
such as socioeconomic conditions, gender, education, level of access to information, political 
awareness and the like contribute, too. Still, even though the above factors were statistically 
significant in terms of policy preference, ethnic identity was the most powerful of them.12  
Social polarization is strongly correlated with bad policies and slow development. Whilst 
many paths lead to polarisation, ethnic diversity appears to be positively correlated with 
corruption and ethnic patronage, which themselves can lead to polarization. Ethnic diversity 
accounts for about 28 per cent of the policies adapted in ethnically fragmented countries, 
which in turn are largely responsible for the difference in growth between East Asia and 
Africa.13 Each group uses the common resources to benefit only themselves without 
instituting policies capable of replenishing said resource. For instance, in post-independence 
Kenya, presidential candidates received the greatest majority of support in regions inhabited 
by their tribal countrymen. Tribal fragmentation also has a profound effect on the provision 
of public goods such as roads and health care. Whenever a member of a given tribe (Moi, 
Kalenjin, and the like) came to power, their tribal lands would be given disproportionate 
attention and investment, at the expense of the losers, thus resulting in disproportionate 
development and ethnically-based resentment.14  
 
A large body of empirical research on the USA seems to replicate some of these conclusions 
in the developed world, though there is no direct evidence that those findings are universally 
applicable. According to it, public goods provision is noticeably inferior in ethnically 
fragmented American communities, which bear higher expenses on average, yet provide 
                                                             
11 Ibid 
12 Ibid 
13 Easterly and Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy”. 
14 Ibid.  
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fewer public goods. 15 New York and Los Angeles have to constantly deal with issues of 
racial fragmentation and conflict, but they also rate high on innovation in arts and business, to 
name a few. As such, circumstantial evidence suggests that even though ethnic or racial 
diversity may pose a distinct set of problems, it can either contribute to innovation or at least 
do not interfere with it in a decisive manner.16 Likewise, social spending is much lower in the 
more racially and ethnically diverse USA than it is in European countries boasting 
comparable socioeconomic development levels. Still, the above might have more to do with 
differing cultural values than with diversity per se, as the US culture generally stresses 
autonomy, financial and otherwise, and invention more than ideological notions of social 
solidarity.  
However, there are several notable alternate explanations of the relationship between ethnic 
and other social diversity and the form societies take. Diversity apparently is beneficial to the 
overall production function of a given society, even though it does not include the cost, such 
as cultural differences, linguistic difficulty, and the like.17 O’ Reilly, Williams and Barsade 
(1997) indicate that higher levels of heterogeneity generate more conflict and communication 
problems, but also higher productivity in richer economies. However, as an experiment by 
Habyarimana et al. (2007) indicates, people may be more willing to share resources with co-
ethnics than with other ethnolinguistic communities. Alberto et al. (2005) suggest that if 
production variety18 is possible without sharing public goods, defined groups may prefer to 
establish smaller jurisdictions to take advantage of their homogenous autarky. Additionally, 
limited empirical data from Kenya suggests social sanctions appear to be more effective if 
imposed from within groups than from outside.19 If the same dynamics hold true in larger 
communities and broader political contexts20, the implications would be profound, as 
whenever standards and sanctions of the broader national community and the ones emanating 
from within groups contradict each other, the latter would prevail. Likewise, if all the above 
premises are accurate, they demonstrate a dynamic wherein ethnic groups have a distinct 
preference to form closed, self-sufficient communities with their fellow ethnics. At worst, 
                                                             
15 Alberto Alesina et al., “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions”, in Quarterly Journal of 
Economics Vol. 114, No. 4 (1999), 1243-1284. 
16 Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara, “Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance”, in 
Journal of Economic Literature September. 43 (2005), 721-61. 
17 Ibid 
18 In this case, ‘production variety’ means a basic, functional socioeconomic system.  
19 Ibid 
20 The original data deals with educational institutions, so extrapolations do not necessarily 
apply to different institutional contexts. 
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this dynamic may translate into ghettoization and secessionism. The history of the Nigerian 
Civil War provides limited evidence to support this assertion, and will be explored in more 
detail in part two of this study. By the same token, this proposition needs to be tested in 
further research.    
Wimmer (2015) provides an alternate explanation. According to his study, public goods 
provision and the quality of governance aren’t directly influenced by ethnic diversity. Rather, 
all three are a product of long-term patterns of state formation. The ideal model suggested is 
as follows: favourable climate permits effective agriculture, which, in turn, makes high 
population densities possible. High population densities, when combined with favourable 
geographies, result in state formation. When the same dynamic occurs among neighbouring 
peoples, a propensity for conflict develops, thus forcing further consolidation of rival states 
and homogenization of their peoples, which, in turn, forces the state to develop public goods 
(such as education and infrastructure) provision networks in order to remain competitive. 
Thus, ethnolinguistic homogeneity does not improve public goods provision – rather, they are 
both products of the long-term historical process, and do not affect each other in meaningful 
ways.21 For instance, France used to be divided into dozens of local identities until the 17th 
century. Around that time, France had become centralised enough as a state to develop 
national and cultural infrastructure as a matter if policy, thus ironing out local identities and 
further homogenising the country. In other words, the correlation between public goods 
provision and ethnolinguistic diversity is a mere accident of history, and the true underlying 
cause for both are long-term patterns of state formation.22 
 
The model, if accurate, throws the usual explanations of Western colonialism being the root 
cause of instability and poverty out of the window. The effects of colonialism would be 
relevant only inasmuch as they affected the legacy of statehood. Long-term factors are 
critical, as early state formation allows for the creation of institutions and the time to iron out 
their flaws, master techniques of public goods provision and become a fixture in public 
perception. Ethnolinguistic diversity may or may not support or impede state formation, as 
seen by the examples of Botswana and Somalia. The former is one of the most stable states in 
Africa, whereas the latter remains in a state of perpetual civil war, even though both enjoy 
                                                             
21 Andreas Wimmer, “Is Diversity Detrimental? Ethnic Fractionalization, Public Goods 
Provision, and the Historical Legacies of Stateness”, Comparative Political Studies (2015), 1-
39. 
22 Ibid 
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high levels of ethnolinguistic homogeneity.23 Since the process of homogenization had been 
present in pre-colonial Africa, and was continued or even accelerated under the colonial 
governments, it would follow that Western empires could not have been responsible for 
arresting this dynamic. As the second part of the study will demonstrate, the case of Nigeria 
broadly supports one aspect of Wimmer’s theory, but provides limited evidence against 
another.  
 
Likewise, Habyarimana, Macartan, Posner and Weinstein (2007) find no evidence that ethnic 
diversity adversely affects core preferences for public goods. In a series of empirical 
experiments conducted in a Kampala slum, they had people of differing ethnicities participate 
in a number of games to discover whether cooperation, generosity and preferences for public 
policies differ between homogenous and heterogeneous teams. The anonymous dictator 
game24 indicated individuals are, on average, as generous towards other ethnicities as they are 
to their fellow ethnics. If representative of broader trends, this would indicate that the mere 
presence of ethnic diversity, even in highly impoverished conditions (the neighbourhood of 
Kampala where the experiment took place is the most underdeveloped and impoverished of 
all), is not enough to stimulate violent conflict. Another game required randomly assigned 
individuals to cooperate in order to solve a puzzle, but there appears to have been no 
difficulty in communication and solve ratio, despite the players’ differing ethnolinguistic 
backgrounds.25 This would suggest that ethnocultural diversity does not necessarily impede 
basic, micro-level collective action. 
 
Several major objections can be raised about the general applicability of Habyarimana et al.’s 
conclusions. As noted above, the area of Kampala all participants came from is the most 
impoverished of all. According to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, human beings require a 
number of things to achieve optimal quality of life. Basic survival is the foundation of all 
others, meaning that culture-related preferences will come into play only once basic physical 
                                                             
23 Ibid 
24 In a game of Dictator, one player receives a fixed amount of money which he can than 
either share with other players, or take all the cash instead. The remaining players have to 
acquiesce to the ‘dictator’s’ decision. At the end of each turn, another player becomes the 
‘dictator’ and the cycle repeats. The game has been used by social and political scientists to 
test individual and group behaviour.   
25 James Habyarimana et al., “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods 
Provision?”, American Political Science Review 101(4) (2007), 709-725. 
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requirements have been satisfied. Since the Kampala slum’s denizens had just to scrape by, it 
is safe to assume the seeds of preference-based conflict might have been there, but had yet to 
come to the fore since the participants were concerned with daily survival. As such, it would 
be a good idea to conduct comparable tests in non-impoverished neighbourhoods boasting 
comparable levels of ethnocultural diversity in order to support or rebut this possibility. As a 
notable corollary, there was a distinct shift in favour of co-ethnics when the games were no 
longer anonymous. If the same dynamic translates into the broader world of politics, it 
becomes evident that politicians would favour their fellow ethnics through increased public 
goods provision at the expense of other groups.26 This is broadly consistent with the Kenyan 
findings. Finally, there is no obvious evidence that the case of Kampala is a representative 
sample of interethnic relations everywhere and at all times. As such, it would be advisable to 
conduct comparable tests in a number of municipalities and countries to see if a broader 
pattern emerges.  
 
In another study, Wimmer (2015) indicates that ethnic inequality and exclusion (as opposed 
to diversity per se) hamper political stability, economic growth and public goods provision. 
He stresses the significance of internal factors, as a lengthy imperial legacy does not appear 
to be correlated with high levels of ethnic exclusion. Likewise, exposure and affiliation with 
the new globalized order appears to only minimally affect the levels of ethnic inclusion. The 
key example quoted is  Switzerland, an ethnolinguistically diverse country which has 
nonetheless managed to build a stable, prosperous nation well integrated into the global 
system. Wimmer argues that effective provision of basic public goods (security, 
infrastructure, economic growth and the like) can allow citizens to build alliances and 
connections between different ethnic groups, as opposed to clientelist patterns of public 
goods provision.27 It can be argued, however, that Switzerland’s success is produced largely 
by the fact that all three major ethnolinguistic groups are culturally cognate to a significant 
extent, and share comparable histories of statehood and socio-political development. As a 
consequence, Switzerland does not reach the levels of diversity correlated with conflict. 
Likewise, the study does not explore the possibility of an ethnolinguistic group making a 
demand unacceptable to others, which is one of the major drivers of ethnocultural conflict in 
Nigeria, and will be explored in detail in the second part of this study. Besides, the theory is 
                                                             
26 Ibid 
27 Andreas Wimmer, “Nation Building. A Long-Term Perspective and Global Analysis”, 
European Sociological Review 31 (1) (2015), 30-47. 
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still preliminary and highly impressionistic, as the dataset which demonstrates its basic 
validity is self-confessedly limited and incomplete. As such, it must be taken with a grain of 
salt, but it represents a testable explanation of the relationship between public goods 
provision and ethnolinguistic diversity.  
Collier (2000) offers a different theory. He concludes the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and political violence combined with poor economic growth is akin to a bell-curve, 
in that the countries most predisposed to ethnic violence are the one which occupy the mid-
range of ethnic diversity. As a consequence, extreme fragmentation and extreme 
homogeneity apparently produce stability, as high fragmentation makes the formation of 
unified rebel outfits increasingly difficult. Importantly, most developing countries occupy the 
peak of the “hump”. Also, low income is positively correlated with a high risk of 
rebellion/civil war, and high levels of diversity on both local and national levels are 
correlated with prevalence of identity politics. In other words, countries with low income, no 
political rights/representation and mid-range fragmentation are the ones most likely to 
experience a bout of civil war. Good governance and public goods provision, however, are 
not cognate with the lack of political violence, even though they may overlap in specific 
cases. As such, the weaknesses of Collier’s theory are that he does not explore the 
relationship between extreme levels of diversity, social trust and the quality of governance. 
Even if extreme fragmentation may bring ‘stability’ of sorts, it is not at all clear that it would 
generate quality policies comparable with those of a unitary society. Likewise, a ‘stable’ state 
is not necessarily prosperous or blessed with high levels of social trust. Finally, the nature of 
the ethnic groups is arguably important, as demonstrated by the case of Switzerland, which 
occupies a spot close to the top of the ‘hump’, yet remains both stable and prosperous.  
To summarize, whilst many other factors go into successful governance and public goods 
provision, very high levels of ethnic diversity do not appear to be universally beneficial, and 
the nature of the groups is a significant factor as well. The above may be linked to the 
ongoing pro-multiculturalism discourse, since some scholars believe pursuing multicultural 
policies serves to increase social cohesion by ensuring the security of minority groups 
(Duyvendak, Pels, Rijkschroeff, 2009; Borevi, 2013; Entzinger, 2013). This, in turn, allows 
the society to retain a key aspect of public safety while fulfilling an ideological imperative. 
However, if Collier’s assertions are correct, a country which aims to produce a multicultural 
society will still have to pass through the potentially violent ‘hump’, which makes the 
probability of societal and political collapse far higher than it would be in a consistently 
homogenous society. This would be broadly consistent with the assertions of scholars critical 
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of multiculturalism who assert that artificially maintained differences will only turn national 
communities into ‘clusters of tribes’ (Blainey, 1984; Gitlin, 1995; Miller, 1995; Scheffer, 
2000; Goodhart, 2004; Huntington, 2004), thus decreasing social safety due to the emergence 
of competing social and cultural mores as well as potentially contradictory political loyalties. 
The ‘clusters of tribes’ appear to be another name for the ‘hump’ phenomenon postulated by 
Collier. 
 
Nigeria provides a useful example to test many of the above proposition for several reasons. 
First of all, its size and complexity make it a “bridge” of sorts between the macro, big-picture 
studies which deal with broad correlations, and micro-level studies, which tend to fail to 
prove their broader applicability. Sa such, Nigeria allows one both to test broader hypotheses 
such as the ones postulated by Collier and Wimmer, and discern specific causal relationships. 
Second, Nigeria is a veritable microcosm of all the relevant issues, such as cultural, ethnic 
and religious diversity and complex historical legacies. As such, it could be argued that, in 
spite of it being a product of specific historical contingencies, it also offers a number of 
generalizable lessons. Finally, contrary to so many inconsequential African statelets, Nigeria 
is worth examining for its own sake, as it boasts the potential to become a true powerhouse if 













  19 
 
 
Part 2: Nigeria and Its Problems 
What is today Nigeria bore witness to complex developments before the arrival of Europeans. 
The natural environment of Nigeria is hostile to human habitation, earning it the title of 
‘white man’s grave’ during the colonial times. Whilst the indigenous population are better 
adjusted to those conditions, struggle over better land defined much of the relations between 
over two hundred tribes speaking over a hundred languages.28 As a consequence, the Yoruba 
established something resembling a proto-nation-state and subjugated their neighbors through 
conquest and diplomacy. The northern groups adopted Islam as a result of contacts with 
merchants from northern Africa and the Middle East and a Fulani jihad shortly before the 
advent of the Europeans. The Ibo ran a network of independent city states and dominated 
other groups through commercial acumen rather than might. By the time the first European 
traders from Portugal appeared, a patchwork of city states and minor empires had emerged. 
However, the local state structures eventually decayed as a result of corruption among their 
elites and infighting, thus setting indigenous tribes and proto-nations for the fall. The British 
took control over what is today Nigeria in the 19th century. The conquest, conducted through 
a combination of military might and deft diplomacy, occurred in two parts – southern Nigeria 
was steadily taken from 1850 to 1897, whereas the Muslim-dominated north submitted by 
1914. At the outset of British domination of the region, Lord Lugard struck a deal with 
Northern Islamic rulers, gaining their support for leaving their customs (including Sharia law 
and religious education) mostly unchanged. As a consequence, the North remained ignorant 
and underdeveloped, whereas the Western and Eastern Nigeria enjoyed the benefits of a 
broad, secular education which translated into relatively greater accomplishment. This 
imbalance generated significant political tensions, which will be explored in more detail in 
the next part of this study.29 The political colonial entity which would later become Nigeria 
was established the same year.30    
 
One legacy of British colonialism in particular stands in the way of effective public goods 
provision. As the British advanced inland, they incorporated vast swathes of territory 
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inhabited by culturally diverse people with no shared history of statehood. As a result, when 
the British granted independence to their former subjects, ‘Nigeria’ existed only on paper and 
not in the hearts and minds of its inhabitants. In many ways, it was the functional equivalent 
of annexing Bulgaria, Turkey and Egypt and later granting them independence as a unitary 
state. The three major groups had had different statehood experiences, as the Yoruba had run 
something resembling an empire, the Hausa had established Islamic emirates whereas the Ibo 
had operated a loose network of nation-states. This, in addition to historical antagonisms and 
the lack of common national identity would present an obstacle to security and political 
stability. In Europe, a semblance of common identity had been established before the formal 
creation of nation states, but in the case of Nigeria the dynamic was reversed. The nation-
state was established by fiat, and common national identity has yet to catch up.31 Likewise, 
the system of indirect rule instituted by the British relied largely on appointing indigenous 
rulers and preserving local customs, many of which were inimical to development. This 
problem was especially acute in the North, as indicated above.32 As a consequence, the case 
of Nigeria is broadly consistent with Wimmer’s thesis about the relationship between organic 
state formation and public goods provision. Moreover, Nigeria appears to fall into the middle 
of the violent “hump” postulated by Collier (2000), as it is too ethnoculturally diverse to 
reach homogenous stability, but not divided enough to make the formation of organized 
factions impossible. 
 
Indeed, regionalism has been a defining problem of Nigerian governance since independence. 
The threat of domination by other ethnic groups remains the bogeyman of Nigeria’s peoples, 
especially the minorities. The same fear has also contributed to serious administrative 
problems during  general Mohammad’s regime, as many ethnic groups struggled to obtain 
states of their own to receive as much of the ‘national cake’ as possible, as services and 
revenues were to be distributed on the state rather than purely numerical basis.33 
Economically, Nigeria has been a long-standing ‘rentier state’, deriving much of its income 
from oil extraction since mid-1960s, which makes it susceptible to global price fluctuations. 
It also discourages the development of indigenous service sector. Furthermore, prebendalism, 
or turning public offices into tools of self-aggrandisement, originated in pre-independence 
Nigeria and continued into the First Republic period, but it was taken to new extremes by a 
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succession of military governments.34 However, Eghosa (1998) argues that prebendalism, 
ethnic politics, poor governance and the like do not fully explain the accelerated political and 
economic decline of 1980s and 1990s. According to the author, self-serving attitudes of 
foreign governments and businesses (including the Western ones) supposedly kept Nigeria in 
a peripheral state. However, whilst there is no doubt that states and businesses pursue their 
self-interests first and foremost, they are far from all-powerful. None of Nigeria’s woes 
would have been possible if not for the venality and incompetence of a succession of 
governments, military or otherwise. Arguably, competent and visionary governments could 
have used Nigeria’s oil wealth to generate its own well-educated workforce, productive 
industry and competitive services, thus becoming a significant player in its own right. The 
fact that virtually every government since the end of the civil war was so malleable suggests 
an internal problem.35 Moreover, military and civilian governments during the First and 
Second Republics lacked the vision and competence to generate sustainable growth. They 
used the funds obtained as a result of the oil boom to fund spectacular projects such as new 
universities and the current capital of Abuja, but did so primarily to spread their influence, 
preserve and expand patronage networks and pander to the locals rather than as a part of 
consistent vision. This was true for both the national and state governments.  
After a succession of military governments, six regions were established (South-East, South-
South, South-West, North-East, North-Central and North-West) to ensure no interest group 
would seize complete power, with most important governmental positions rotated between 
them. However, this still left a number of minorities, especially the ones in the Niger Delta, 
squeezed between the major ethnic groups (the Yoruba, the Ibo and the Hausa/Fulani), with a 
sense of alienation. This was one of the major reasons for the subsequent insurgency 
(examined in detail in the next parts of this study), as local politicians would (unofficially) 
sponsor militias blowing up oil installations and kidnapping foreign workers to force the 
Abuja government to share power with them. They would then use their position to maintain 
their patronage networks.36  
 
Finally, Nigeria is beset by a set of endemic problems which have nothing to do with ethnic 
and other social diversity.  Traditional societies remains profoundly irrational, attributing bad 
policy, lack of economic growth and the like to gods and impersonal forces of evil rather than 
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empirically verifiable dynamics.37 Whilst the precise degree of social credulity is unclear, it 
remains a testable proposition that, if prevalent, perception of events in purely or mostly 
religious terms is likely  to divert the populace from real underlying dynamics of violence 
and corruption. Likewise, Nigerian medical facilities and services are still grossly inadequate. 
On average, there is only one hospital bed for 900,000 persons, and the ratio of doctors to 
population is 1:16,000. Child mortality is high, as one out of twenty-one babies dies, a 
globally significant figure. Blindness, malaria and meningitis are common, and are especially 
dangerous due to insufficient medical facilities. The situation is further aggravated by the fact 
that much of the populace remains ignorant of medical advances and subscribes to various 
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2.1 Political Stability and Ethnic Diversity 
Political instability epitomised by a succession of coups and ethnic conflicts defined much of 
Nigeria’s history.39 Clashes between tribes were a regular occurrence in the period between 
the end of the Second World War and independence.40 As of the time of writing (2016), 
religious conflict is ever present, with pressures from Muslim groups to introduce Sharia law, 
and a number of radical Islamist factions. Likewise, ethnic tensions underpinned Nigeria’s 
politics during the brief period of the First Republic democracy, which culminated in the civil 
war of 1967-70. To clarify, the unpopular government of Chief Akintola used anti-Ibo 
rhetoric to remain in power and to distract the populace from more pressing internal 
problems, such as endemic corruption. His warnings of ‘Ibo Empire’ were unwittingly borne 
out by a coup against the (largely Hausa/Fulani) elites of the First Republic, whom the 
plotters (mostly Ibo military officers) perceived as corrupt and nepotistic. Expending Ibo 
influence was not the purpose of the coup; rather, the Ibo had been greatly over-represented 
in the pre-war and pre-independence Nigerian military. However, it occurred within the 
context of regional politics, with the Hausa-Fulani Northerners, Ibo Easterners and Yoruba 
Westerners forming the most influential factions, and mistrusting one another.41 As a 
consequence, even though the coup targeted politicians perceived as corrupt, Northerners 
were disproportionately represented among its victims.42  
 
The coup thus unwittingly fuelled conspiracy theories about ‘Ibo plots’, which would play a 
major role in the conflict’s escalation. The surviving government handed over power to 
General Ironsi (himself an Ibo), who would head an Ibo-dominated government in the 
aftermath. He decided to force through a unified political system, turning Nigeria from a 
federation into a unitary republic. This attempt to impose unity by fiat, however, inflamed 
fears among various tribes that their traditional ways of life were threatened, and that a new 
system would mean greater competition for high government posts, which the North (whose 
educational attainment was the lowest in the country as a result of, among others, insufficient 
number of schools and a highly conservative Islamic culture) was bound to lose. Tensions run 
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high, resulting in a number of highly-publicised Ibo massacres in the North, with body count 
as high as 100,000.43 Things escalated from there, with Ironsi assassinated by Northern 
officers and the Ibo attempting to secede and form their own state of Biafra, rich in oil 
reserves. This triggered the civil war which would consume over a million lives, the majority 
of them Ibo. Even though the war had a strong economic overtone, as the secessionist state of 
Biafra boasted massive oil reserves and was thus too important for Lagos to lose, it would 
never have began without the combination of regional rivalries and ethnic clashes.44    
From the diversity perspective, two major conclusions can be drawn from this case. First of 
all, “ethnic hatreds” did not start the conflict – rather, ethnic tensions underpinned much of 
Nigeria’s politics and were inflamed to breaking point as a consequence of the coup. Second, 
taking the above caveat under consideration, ethnic and cultural diversity nonetheless played 
a significant part in starting the conflict. This author would argue that cultural values are not 
merely the cherry on top of civilizational cake; rather, they inform the actions of their 
carriers, thus indirectly shaping the environment in which they live. As a consequence, 
drastically different cultural practices may result in significant differences in socioeconomic 
attainment. It was indeed a case in Nigeria, as cultural differences between the North and the 
South had resulted in different educational attainment and thus uneven socioeconomic 
prospects in a unitary state, and ethnic identity politics permitted for Ibo scapegoating. In 
other words, the consequences of competing cultural values and practices within the same 
political context set the stage for the conflict, with ethnicity being secondary and 
instrumentalized.     
 
The so-called Second Republic (1979-1983) was born after a period of military dictatorship 
following the end of the civil war. In 1979, the military, after a series of coups and 
countercoups, handed over power to civilian authorities. However, the new Nigerian 
democracy survived only four years. As electoral fraud and widespread corruption weakened 
the foundation of the state, the army moved in and took power once more. This time, 
however, it enjoyed the support of the people tired of long-standing corruption and 
dysfunction. Still, the army was far larger than was necessary to defend the country. Its 
massive size was a result of the civil war wherein the military’s numbers swelled in order to 
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regain control of the country. This, however, carried over to post-war order, and consumed 
disproportionate percentage of national expenditure, which could have otherwise contributed 
to public goods generation.45 As a consequence, the consequences of the army’s size 
unwittingly contributed to lower public goods provision.  
 
A new constitution was adopted, which was based on the principle of federalism Ironsi had 
tried to eliminate. However, the new states were established with little regard to actual ethnic 
composition of given territories, which means numerous minorities ended up dissatisfied and 
underrepresented in the “new” federal state. Likewise, the major groups controlled most of 
the states, and fears of domination by the North remained endemic, thus promoting the 
formation of de facto ethnic parties and the prevalence of identity politics.46 As such, ethnic 
identity and socioeconomic factors mutually reinforced each other. As a consequence, this 
episode broadly supports the conclusions of Wimmer’s study. This period witnessed 
economic decline, political corruption, authoritarian politics as well as a rise in Jihadist 
activities in the North. National dysfunction reached its apex with the electoral fraud of 1983, 
which the military used as, along with gross economic mismanagement, as a pretext to seize 
power once more. 
 
The triple regimes following the fall of the Second Republic were essentially variations on 
the same themes as Ironsi, Muhammed and Obasanjo’s regimes. Muhammad Buhari, who 
wielded power in the years 1983-1985, oversaw further economic decline and the fall of the 
middle class which had emerged in the decade following the civil war, thus moving Nigeria 
closer to the ‘civil war’ end of Collier’s (2000) spectrum. Political corruption ran rampant, as 
Buhari’s brutal regime used it as a tool of management. Even though his regime staged highly 
publicised trials of corrupt officials, the standards were inconsistent and the punishments had 
a distinctly ethnic flavour, as the Southerners were punished far more severely for the same 
crimes.47 The greatest problem, however, was a lack of consistent vision on the part of the 
military. The vast majority of its measures were haphazard and substituted accuracy for speed 
and decisiveness. Likewise, its application of economic measures was highly selective, as the 
army never lacked funds for ever more expansive projects. Whether it was driven by cynical 
opportunism or mere myopia is of little consequence; one way or another, it cost the Army 
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much of its legitimacy. The above is significant from the perspective of this study, as it 
indicates that ethnic conflict was far from the sole “villain” responsible fore bad policies 
during the military regimes. Rather, prevalent incompetence resulted in dysfunctional 
policies, which, in turn, were made more aggravating to the populace by ethnic politicking.   
Ibrahim Babangida’s reign of 1985-1993 exacerbated the economic decline, finishing of the 
middle class and increasing unemployment. As a consequence, Nigeria’s public safety fell to 
new lows, damaging its international reputation even further. General Sanni Abacha’s regime 
(1993-1998) continued this grim trend. He took the by-then proverbial Nigerian corruption to 
new heights, openly taking money from Nigeria’s Central Bank and privatising public 
property, which he and his cronies would then buy at dumping prices. The legacy of those 
two decades was a dysfunctional, corrupt, economically ravaged country internationally 
famous for its failures and shortcomings.48 To summarize, the fundamental problems of 
Nigeria’s post-civil war military governments were corruption, lack of vision and prevalent 
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2.2 Ethnocultural Cleavages and Public Security  
The relationship between democracy, stability and ethnic diversity is arguably complex and 
highly contingent on local factors. States such as Canada or Belgium have been able to use 
democracy to channel ethnic tensions in a non-destructive way, whereas the ethnic conflicts 
in many African states or Sri Lanka, to name a few, have been exacerbated to a level making 
them impossible to be resolved via democratic process alone.49 Other relevant determinants 
are the level of cultural similarity between two or more ethnic groups, the causes and the 
nature of the process through which their territories became a single state, their history, and 
(in some cases) the existence of ethnic or religious supremacist movements (such as the Serbs 
in pre-WWII Yugoslavia, or radical Islamists in a number of contemporary countries). For 
these reasons, whilst ethnic diversity almost invariably generates challenges unheard of in 
ethnically homogenous societies, it merely creates a possibility of true strife. As such, even 
though Nigeria broadly supports the correlation between ethnic diversity and conflict, it is 
still necessary to examine these ethnic conflicts within their own context to determine 
whether they are driven by contingent and therefore surmountable factors, or whether they 
are far more fundamental and thus a permanent obstacle to public goods provision.  
 
At the same time, whilst the mere existence of ethnic diversity is not a sufficient cause for 
strife, there is nonetheless a powerful correlation between ethnic diversity and internal 
conflict, especially if one of the constituent ethnic groups happens to be disproportionately 
successful, economically or politically. A classic example of this dynamic are the Ibo of 
Nigeria, who are sometimes referred to as the “Jews of Africa” due to their considerable 
commercial acumen, which transcends the boundaries of Nigeria, and the resulting economic 
power they wield in the region.50 However, it is an unfortunate aspect of human nature to 
experience jealousy of others. At best, it may stimulate effort to match the accomplishment of 
the successful party. However, at its worst jealousy, both individual and collective, reaches 
pathological levels and results in a backlash against the more successful party, regardless of 
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whether it is actually responsible for the weaker party’s shortcomings and failures. This 
dynamic applies to both individuals and groups.   
 
Nigeria is an example of this broad dynamic. The divide between the mostly 
Christian/animist South and the Muslim-dominated North is one of the most serious in 
Nigeria, as numerous Muslim leaders, including the moderate ones, have aggressively pushed 
for Islamic legislation. The short-lived Second Republic saw a spike in jihadist activity in the 
North, which was driven by a new variety of Islam created and promoted by a radical cleric, 
Muhammadu Marwa. The conflict was driven by a characteristic combination of 
uncompromising, hardliner leadership and poor socioeconomic conditions in the North which 
generated a fertile recruitment pool. On a broader level, it was a manifestation of a long-term 
rivalry and conflict between Islam and Christianity in Nigeria.51 Likewise, in 1999, several 
Northern governors demanded the introduction of the Sharia law, the support of which is 
believed to be a duty of true believers. This, however, further inflamed tensions.52 Moreover, 
this dynamic is aggravated by the fact that religion and politics are fused into an indivisible 
whole in Islam, which rests on universalism and an expansionist imperative.53 Extreme levels 
of corruption and underdevelopment further contributed to those tensions, as did the fact that 
the religious split largely overlaps with the ethnic one, as the majority of the Hausa are 
Muslim, whereas the Christians advocating a secular state are overrepresented among the 
Yoruba.54   
 
The incident in the city of Kaduna illustrates this broader principle and demonstrates the 
possible consequences of two fundamentally incompatible viewpoints occupying the same 
political space. Following the announcement that elements of Sharia would be introduced, the 
radical Christian Association of Nigeria staged an illegal anti-Sharia demonstration, bearing 
provocative banners. This resulted in a violent backlash from the Muslim community. The 
subsequent clashes lasted for two days and claimed approximately two thousand lives until 
the army restored order.55 To make things worse, many of the Christian victims were Ibo, 
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which resulted in violent counter-purges in the South. It was a case of a primarily religious 
conflict in the clothing of an ethnic one. 
 
These tensions continue as of the time of writing (2016). The religious conflict is embodied 
by Boko Haram (also known as Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi following its declaration of 
loyalty to the Islamic State), a well-organised, if somewhat divided Islamist organisation. It is 
highly secretive and enjoys significant support networks in north-eastern Nigeria, especially 
among the minority Kanuri ethnic group, which their leader Abubakar Shekau hails from. It 
receives financial support from other Islamist movements, such as al-Qaeda, and is suspected 
of receiving aid from a number of Nigerian Government members as a way of pressuring the 
central government for concessions.56 It has conducted some spectacular attacks throughout 
Nigeria, but its main stronghold are the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa.57 In 2015, Boko 
Haram controlled significant swathes of territory in Northern Nigeria, including a number of 
towns in north-east, which made the state of Borno essentially ungovernable until the 
government counteroffensive in 2016. Even though it was eventually pushed out from most 
its gains, the Nigerian military had to contend with severe logistical problems, poor 
equipment and low morale, as several units outright refused to engage Boko Haram in 
battle.58 The problem is further compounded by the fact that Boko Haram is not the only 
jihadist outfit active in Nigeria, with Iran-sponsored Islamists also destabilising the country. 
The latter, however, is a part of the long-standing conflict between Israel and USA on one 
hand, and Iran on the other, as the Iran-sponsored outfits usually target USA and Israeli 
missions and organisations in Nigeria, rather than Abuja itself.59 The above case studies 
provide some evidence against Easterly and Levine’s (1997) claim that there is no correlation 
between religious fragmentation and the quality of government, as it was precisely religious 
fragmentation which made swathes of the North ungovernable. More precisely, on the basis 
of the above it could be argued that mutually exclusive sets of ideas, religious or otherwise, 
are unlikely to coexist in peace, especially if at least one of them boasts a universalist, 
expansionist message.  
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Another significant example of ethnic conflict was the wars between the Jokun and the Tiv 
peoples, who inhabit the state of Taraba. Even though they have both coexisted in the same 
geographic space, the relations between them have changed substantially over the past 
hundred and fifty years or so. Initially, the relations between the two peoples were quite 
cordial, until the advent of the British who governed through the so-called Indirect Rule 
system, wherein they delegated authority to indigenous rulers to govern in their name. In case 
of the Tiv and the Jokun, however, the system backfired spectacularly. Aku Uka, the chief 
figure of the Jokun people, got the job, and was to govern both people in the name of the 
colonial overlords, but before long he and his successors began to abuse their power and 
influence. As a consequence, relations between the Tiv and the Jokun steadily deteriorated, 
reaching the level of outright hostility which occasionally erupted into minor civil wars, the 
most recent of which occurred in late 1990s and 2000s. This dynamic provides some 
evidence to support the broad contention that ethnic and cultural diversity undermines public 
safety and stability, just like the division between the Muslims and the Christians/Animists.60 
This is just a case in point, however, as tensions between minor ethnicities and the 
Hausa/Fulani Muslim in the so-called Middle Belt which houses over half of Nigeria’s ethnic 
groups remain tense and flare up occasionally.61 At the same time, it also illustrates the 
mutable nature of ethnic relations, as the relationship between the Tiv and the Jokun is driven 
by historical factors rather than some primordial, fundamental incompatibility.   
 
Several key conclusions can be drawn from the above cases. First of all, the broad academic 
consensus, while generally accurate, arguably misses some critical nuance, since what truly 
drives the North-South conflict is not cultural diversity per se, but long-term consequences of 
competing values and cultural imperatives. As a consequence, it could be argued that what 
really matters is not the raw number of cultures, but the convergence (or lack thereof) of 
values and imperatives. Second, even though those differences are the root cause of the 
conflict, vast socioeconomic disparities resulting from them can make recruitment far easier 
for ideological true believers. In a case of grim irony, impoverished masses may end up 
supporting the very ideologies which had made their poverty possible in the first place. Third, 
the much-overused concept of “ethnic hatreds” is highly relative, as the conflict between the 
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Tiv and the Jokun peoples is a product of historically contingent circumstances rather than 
some primordial hostility. Finally, the above cases studies offer some evidence to refute one 
aspect of Wimmer’s proposition, as in the case of Nigeria the negative consequences of 
ethnic diversity indeed appear to adversely affect both state formation and public goods 
provision, as opposed to his ideal model wherein diversity and public goods provision do not 

























2.3 Economic Development 
Effective provision of public goods is predicated on a healthy, competitive economy. On 
paper, Nigeria has all the necessary tools to fuel its growth and provide the required 
infrastructure. Its current population is approximately 180 million, and is projected to 
increase to 300 million (the rough equivalent of the population of the United States) by 
2050.62 If properly educated and competitive, these yet-unborn Nigerians could be a power to 
reckon with, and might conceivably forge Nigeria into a pre-eminent power in Africa. 
Likewise, the country has significant oil reserves, which are responsible for approximately 40 
per cent of its income.63 In 1970s, Nigeria became a member of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries, and its oil revenues allowed it to significantly expand the 
infrastructure, education and the like, though they are obsolete by now.64 However, a 
succession of governments squandered much of those revenues through inefficiency and 
corruption, producing increasing inequalities in the process. The 1970s oil boom was a 
pivotal moment, and, in retrospect, could have been used to kick-start Nigeria’s potential. 
However, General Gowon’s regime misused it. In spite of a massive increase in revenues, he 
invested them in greater salaries for civil servants and prestige activities, such as culture 
festivals and foreign aid to poorer African nations, rather than the expansion of competitive, 
productive capacity. National infrastructure was significantly expanded, but it did not 
translate into higher standards of living for the populace, and is already obsolete as of the 
time of writing. The twin regimes of Mohammed and Obasanjo would compound this 
mistake by spending oil revenue on imports without building up productive capacity capable 
of taking over.65  
 
In addition to short-sighted, incompetent governments, Nigeria suffers from extreme levels of 
corruption.66 If anything, no developing country embodies the adverse effect on public goods 
by corruption and dysfunctional government more than Nigeria. By 1998, Transparency 
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International declared Nigeria to be the most corrupt country in the world due to the epic 
levels of economic looting by the contemporary governments. There is a finite amount of 
money in any economy, and public goods come with a price tag which cannot be covered if 
public funds are embezzled instead. Nigeria is a textbook example of such an internal 
dynamics and their consequences.67 
 
Likewise, a functional judicial system and consistent application of the law are other public 
goods the lack of which is both a cause and a symptom of endemic corruption. As a 
consequence, Nigeria saw a succession of military regimes, many of which abrogated the rule 
of law entirely. This generated a frenzy of looting which effectively arrested development of 
the country and, by extension, the provision of public goods. The consequences were 
staggering – between 1960 and 1999, a succession of Nigerian governments expropriated 
USD440 billion which otherwise could have served to generate public goods.68 The dynamic 
is essentially a vicious cycle, as the lack of the rule of law contributes to underdevelopment, 
which, in turn, promotes corruption, preventing the rule of law from being effectively 
introduced and enforced.    
 
As a consequence of corruption, incompetence and international sanctions per capita income 
decreased by 80 per cent since 1970s, in spite of the oil boom. Crime rates have risen as a 
result (both organized and petty). These problems are further exacerbated by relatively low 
foreign investment levels due to the country’s bad reputation, which leads to a vicious cycle – 
no investment means no revenue, no revenue means weak budget, weak budget means fewer 
public goods. This pushes many to a life of crime, which, in turn, preserves the bad reputation 
which made the problem so severe in the first place.69 The problem is further compounded by 
sundry rebel outfits operating in the oil-rich areas of Nigeria. The Movement for the 
Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) is representative of this trend, and has been targeting 
oil interests for decades now. Likewise, the Niger Delta Avengers attack foreign oil 
installations, severely curtailing production and hampering the Nigerian economy. Since 
much of Nigeria’s income depends on oil sales, the Delta rebels do not improve the locals’ lot 
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in any meaningful way, but limit the amount of resources available to the central government, 
thus making everyone in Nigeria worse off in the long run.70  
However, corruption is not just a problem sui generis, but a product of social and cultural 
mores incompatible with modern nation building and good governance. Nigerian politicians, 
including those from the oil-rich Niger Delta, see the redistribution of resources and political 
power as a zero-sum game. This is further compounded by a deeply ingrained and historically 
prominent culture of patronage networks, wherein the socially dominant groups or 
individuals provide the weaker ones with resources, protection or status in exchange for 
loyalty and political support.71 The case of Alhaji Adegoke Adelabu, a prominent late-
colonial and post-colonial patron, illustrates the nature of the system. Adelabu built his 
political power using the uneducated, impoverished majority of Ibadan, capitalizing on their 
shared Islamic faith and uniting them against the ‘alien’ ethnic minorities. He eventually rose 
to the post of chairman of the Ibadan council, and used his new position to provide his 
‘electorate’ with funds and resources from the state treasury. Lamidi Adedibu, an ally of 
Obafemi Awolowo, was another prominent patron, who used his economic influence to 
provide public goods (basic education, infrastructure, and the like) to his clients in the 
countryside.  
 
This system contributes towards the tense situation in the Niger Delta. Nigerian government 
members have unofficially supported rebel outfits through patronage networks, using the 
former to force concessions from the central government, which allows them to strengthen 
and expand their local influence. To make things worse, the insurgent movements in the 
Delta region are split along ethnopolitical lines and have clashed in the past, further 
destabilising the region. The region entered a period of relative calm during the rule of 
Goodluck Jonathan as a consequence of an amnesty campaign ran by the president. However, 
a number of rebel outfits remain and may strike again in the future.72 Thus, these conflicts are 
driven by a combination of corruption and underdevelopment, both of which are buttressed 
by patronage networks. Ethnic diversity per se does not cause it, but uneven development 
resulting from patronage networks tends to be split along ethnic lines, inspiring a sort of 
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fundamental causal attribution error on behalf of the common folk and demagogues alike. At 
the same time, it must be emphasized that the basic causal process behind the Niger Delta 
insurgencies does not necessarily apply to every conflict in Nigeria.  
Alutayo et al. (2015) assert the pre-colonial patronage systems were functional and 
beneficial.73 The claim, however, is spurious on three grounds. First of all, the lack of reliable 
primary sources makes it uncertain that the original system was truly as beneficial as they 
claim. Moreover, even if it was, it is unlikely it would have been suitable for modern nation 
building and equitable public goods provision, since one of the fundamental aspects of a 
modern nation state is providing public goods to all citizens, regardless of personal 
relationships and bias. Since even the ‘pure’ patronage system was predicated on 
personalized relationships, it would have been inimical to impersonal bureaucracy. Finally, 
the patronage system is inherently unstable. Whilst it can provide public goods to a specific 
group of people on one hand74, its highly personal nature makes it vulnerable to periodic 
upheavals. The death of the patron can result in a halt to public good provision, whilst 
disparities resulting from the system may result in conflict, especially when they run along 
ethnic and religious lines. 
 
The relationship between corruption and ethnic diversity in Nigeria thus supports the broad 
academic consensus that there is a strong correlation between ethnic diversity on one hand, 
and corruption on the other. However, closer analysis suggests the true underlying problem is 
a broken political culture, as Nigerian patronage networks and corruption have been endemic 
even within the same ethnic groups. As such, ethnic diversity exacerbates the problem rather 
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The academic consensus broadly supports the assertion that ethnocultural diversity and 
political stability, public safety and economic growth, to name a few, do not go together. 
However, a number of dissenting and/or more nuanced views exist, which attribute diversity 
and public goods provision to long-term patterns of state formation, political representation 
or lack thereof, and the exact level of fragmentation, to name a few. The ‘big picture’ studies, 
however, tend to get lost in correlations and broad associations to such an extent that they fail 
to explain the specific causal relationships. Conversely, micro-level studies tend to be 
spatially and temporally limited, which limits their broader applicability. For this reason, 
Nigeria presents an excellent case study, as it is massive enough to permit broad, theoretical 
and longitudinal approach, but also limited enough to make specific causal relationships 
possible to identify.  
In broadest terms, an analysis of Nigeria adds nuance to the academic consensus, but it still 
presents us with a discouraging picture of ethnic and other social diversity. Upon the 
country’s independence, Queen Elizabeth II stated that the country’s future was ‘full of 
promise (…), its people working towards the (…) path of progress’.75 Future events belied 
that cheery vision. Nigeria’s fundamental problems were historical and structural, as 
constituent peoples had had different experiences of statehood, and cultures tended to be 
based on mutually incompatible ideals, many of which translated into uneven 
accomplishment, as was the case in the North. Those socioeconomic inequalities made it 
easier for hardliner ideologues to increase their movements’ numbers, a dynamic which 
continues to destabilize swathes of Nigerian territory. Likewise, even though Nigeria’s 
persistent failure to reach its full potential was driven largely by a combination of 
incompetence, short-sightedness and dysfunctional political culture shared by many 
ethnicities, developmental inequalities and coups have tended to overlap with ethnocultural 
identities, largely constructed though they may have been. As a consequence, even though 
perceptions of ethnicity played a significant part is driving conflict and damaging Nigeria’s 
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political and economic realms, it also served to obscure other serious factors, such as 
culturally-mandated patronage networks and lack of vision on individual leaders’ and 
governments’ part. Unless those underlying problems are addressed, Nigeria is likely to 
continue going on in violent circles. Another key nuance is that even though conflicts in 
Nigeria have tended to run along ethnic lines, their root causes tended to differ. The North-
South split, driven primarily by religious divisions and its consequences, and the Tiv-Jokun 
conflict, which is driven by historical factors, are cases in point.           
Theoretically, even though the above dynamics have recurred with monotonous regularity, 
they are not cast in stone and utterly impossible to mitigate or effectively manage. However, 
by the same token Nigeria provides strong circumstantial evidence that ethnic, cultural and 
other social diversity is not inherently beneficial, and may indeed destabilize the state. As a 
corollary, whilst the essential nature of long-standing settler societies such as Canada or 
USA, and of primordially tribal societies such as Nigeria, exhibits profound differences, the 
case of Nigeria still offers a number of lessons significant from the policy making 
perspective. First of all, culturally-rationalised practices are not mere decoration, and are 
likely to have significant socioeconomic consequences. As such, unless those practices are 
discouraged and eventually eradicated through vigorous, and, if need be, ruthless legislation, 
large-scale migration from cultures with fundamentally different concepts of right and wrong 
will bring those same attitudes with it. As a corollary, if said practices result in inferior 
socioeconomic attainment and ghettoization, social instability and decreased public safety are 
likely. Whilst the case examined in this study (Muslim North versus Christian South) is set 
against the backdrop of a “primordially” divided society, the same dynamic could 
conceivably be replicated in the developed world through misguided immigration and 
cultural preservation policy. These facts offer circumstantial evidence against the belief that 
ethnocultural diversity is inherently desirable. As such, further research into the topic, free of 
bias or politically correct notions, is both necessary and urgent.    
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